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Growth is good but it must be a meticulously
planned growth that overlooks no contingencies.
Otherwise a company is likely to find itself in the
unhappy position of the Durard Company—

A BACKWARD LOOK AT FORWARD PLANNING
by Thomas S. Dudick
Ernst & Ernst

HEN sound business poli
cies are subordinated to
rapid growth, profits suffer
liquidation of past gains is the in
evitable result. This article de
scribes a pattern that has been
typical for many companies and it
recommends a set of guidelines for
orderly growth in the form of ten
commandments for expansion.
The desire of management for
bigness can be the by-product of a
desire for a place in the sun. The
bigger the company, the more im
portant the executives of that com
pany become in the business
community. Bigness, in this case,
is a matter of pride coupled with
aggressiveness and ambition.
The need for bigness can also
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be ordained by the forces of com
petition, which are continually
squeezing out the marginal pro
and
ducer who does not have the re
sources to keep up with the growth
of technology.
Whichever of these two factors
provides the motivation for growth,
the desired end product is a
volume that results in higher pro
fits through reduced unit costs of
production.
High volume, when it results in
longer runs, can result in reduced
unit costs for such direct costs as
material and direct labor.
Raw material needs, for ex
ample, become smaller per unit
because scrap losses due to rejec
tions do not increase proportion
ately with the increase in volume.

The momentum of a long run tends
to stabilize quality with the result
that rejections become an increas
ingly smaller percentage of the
total quantity of production.
Direct labor costs per unit also
decrease because higher volume
runs permit improvements in pro
duction methods. The part that
was previously hand-soldered or
hand-welded might now justify
tooling up for automation and “con
veyorizing.” Subassemblies can be
made on separate lines that feed
into the main line at the appro
priate point.
Also, because longer runs per
mit many of the operations to be
broken down into simpler steps,
manual dexterity becomes more
important than high labor skills.
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Labor rates can then be reduced
accordingly.
Many profit-conscious manage
ments recognize the importance of
volume as a contributor to lower
unit costs and greater profits. Ac
cordingly, they seek to expand
through purchase of other com
panies in a similar business and
through expansion from within.
But there is an obverse side to
this, too. Many companies in pur
suit of the obvious advantages of
size, both in operating economy
and prestige, have pursued it
while neglecting the most common
warnings of good business sense.
Penn Central Railroad, which
achieved giant corporate size by
merging two transportation com
panies with entirely different
methods, operating philosophies,
and even computer systems, is only
the most prominent recent ex
ample. There are others, less pub
licized but equally disastrous.
Growth is good, yes, but only if
it is a balanced growth. If it is
just a reckless striving for size,
without regard for other factors—
compatibility, staff abilities, even
tual goals—then it can become a
disaster. Consider, for example, the
Durard Company.
The Durard Plastics Company’s
products consist of plastic mold
ing, metal stamping, and related
hand assembly operations. The
product line includes such items
as push buttons for radios, plastic
knobs for appliances, plastic bot
tles with caps, electric shaver
parts, small radio cabinets, and a
variety of metal parts used in the
appliance industry.
The management of this com-

THOMAS S. DUDICK is
a manager in the man
agement services divis
ion of Ernst & Ernst,
New York. He serves as
a consulting editor for
this magazine. Mr. Dudick is the author of
Cost Controls for In
dustry,
published
by
Prentice-Hall, plus numerous articles which
have appeared in many professional publi
cations. He has been a guest lecturer at the
Harvard Business School, Loyola College, and
Boston University.

16

pany wanted to increase its share
of the market. It planned to
achieve this goal through the pur
chase of established companies as
well as through internal expansion.
As each acquisition was digested,
the plan was to move the opera
tions to the town of Durard, for
which the parent company was
named.
The management of the com
pany was disappointed in its pro
gress — and changed general
managers three times during a
six-year period. The chronology
of events leading to management
dissatisfaction was as follows:
Purchase of Acme Plastics and
Expansion from Within. Acme Plas
tics became a part of Durard in
August of the first year—as indicat
ed in the pictorial diary represent
ed by the facing chart. This ac
quisition resulted in a substantial
increase in sales volume, as well as
profits. Since plans called for all
Acme activities to be moved to
Durard, a building expansion pro
gram was undertaken. This was
completed in the spring of the
second year, and the move was
made. Concurrently with the com
pletion of this move, 12 injec
tion molding presses were pur
chased and set up in the expanded
plant. The combination of the
Acme move and the establishment
of an injection molding depart
ment proved to be “too big a bite.”
Since only key supervisory per
sonnel of the Acme Company
were transferred, critically needed
skills, such as setup men and die
and mold repair men, were in short
supply. Utilization of equipment,
which had normally been running
at 95 per cent, now dropped to
an average of 45 to 50 per cent.
The new injection molding presses
ran less than 25 per cent of the
time for several months following
installation while “bugs” were be
ing taken care of and operators
and setup men trained.
Naturally, these problems re
flected themselves in reduced sales
volume as well as reduced profits.
As a result, the second year ended
with a loss.

Sales had slipped throughout the
second year because of the com
pany’s inability to make shipments
to customers. Some improvement
was experienced during the third
year. Utilization of the equipment
transferred from Acme increased to
75 per cent—somewhat short of the
desired 90 to 95 per cent. The
newly purchased injection molding
equipment still lagged at 65 per
cent of production goals rather
than at the anticipated level. The
company believed it would take
from six to nine months more be
fore utilization of the equipment
could attain optimum levels. The
profit outlook still was not good
but improvement seemed in sight.
Because the Durard Company was
in sound financial condition, it was
able to weather the storm. Under
similar conditions other companies
would have failed.
Purchase of the PIC Company.
The general manager, who had
been with Durard two years, had
been released and replaced by a
new man. The new man was ad
vised of the company’s interest in
growth and of the recent problems
that had been encountered.
Shortly after taking over, the
new general manager learned that
the PIC Company, which was in
financial straits and losing money,
could be purchased at a bargain
price. This purchase would permit
Durard to immediately get into
another related product line and
pick up PIC’s customers. With the
Acme move out of the way, the
decision was made to purchase
PIC and to transfer the operations
to Durard as soon as possible.
Within two months, the un
profitable hand assembly items
were moved. It was felt that the
high labor rates paid at PIC’s
former location made profits there
out of the question. The substan
tially lower rates in the Durard
area should help considerably. Al
though the rates were lower, man
agement miscalculated on two
other counts:

1. Purchasing and production
scheduling personnel were unManagement Adviser

Durard expansion completed
Acme Plastics moved to Durard Plant
—Injection molding Section established
(shortage of set-up and die repair men)
(equipment utilization very low)

Purchased PIC Company

PIC Assembly operations moved to Durard
Strike of construction workers
(incomplete bills of material cause problems)

— Started second expansion of Durard Plant
—Second Durard expansion completed

press operations transferred to Durard
(PIC tooling in bad condition)

pic

— Minor business recession

Prolonged strike experienced by major competitor

PROJECTION BASED ON RATE OF
GROWTH FOR FIRST THREE YEARS

PROJECTION BASED ON RATE OF
GROWTH FOR FIRST FIVE YEARS

DURARD COMPANY ACTUAL AND PROJECTED SALES FOR TEN YEAR PERIOD

Purchased Acme Plastics
— Started first expansion of Durard Plant

familiar with the new product
line. Bills of material were in
complete because PIC person
nel had carried this information
“in their heads” rather than in
documented records.
2. The Durard plant could not ac
commodate the PIC press op
erations. The trouble was not
lack of space but the wrong
type of floor construction. PIC’s
heavy presses required heavily
reinforced floors.
PIC press operators and tool
shop men were leaving as soon as
they could find other employment
—knowing that their tenure was
limited. Downtime on presses, be
cause of shortage of skilled person
nel, increased astronomically. Plans
for the second Durard expansion
were hurriedly made, but actual
work could not start because of an
unexpected strike that closed down
all construction in the area. Final
ly, with the settlement of the
strike, construction began late in
the year. Durard made a small
profit that year, but its working
capital was becoming strained.
The second expansion was com
pleted late in the spring of the
fourth year. Production schedules
were firmed up and certain PIC
items were now running at high
volume. But then problems began
to mount again. The tools used at
PIC were of a poor quality—no
longer meeting the tighter require
ments of the industry, which had
greatly increased the use of auto
mated assembly equipment. As a
result, many fabricated parts that
did not meet the greater tolerances
that were required had to be
scrapped or reworked.
It was obvious that a substantial
retooling program was required. In
the meantime, productivity had
dropped and production schedules
had to be “juggled” frequently to
satisfy specific customer demands.
The tooling program would require
from 15 to 18 months before
it could be completed. In the
meantime, production output con
tinued to drop with a resultant
slippage, of course, in sales and pro
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fits. To add to the problems, a
business recession developed near
the end of the fourth year during
what was normally a high volume
production period. Although the
recession was relatively mild, pro
ductivity continued to slip while
the company frantically tried to
find competent tool makers to
speed up the retooling program.
At this point the general manager
was relieved of his responsibilities
and still another new man was
brought in.
The new general manager (let’s
call him Norm Bayard) was some
what surprised to learn that his
predecessors had had such a short
tenure. He realized that if he me
chanically picked up the reins,
without some deeper investigation,
he might fall victim to the same
problems that had resulted in the
release of his predecessors.
In his “get acquainted” inter
views with the members of his
staff, he decided that he would
attempt to determine exactly what
the problems were and how they
might have been prevented—or, at
least, greatly minimized. He sensed
that some of the staff would, un
doubtedly, in the role of “Monday
morning quarterbacks,” apply the
20/20 vision of hindsight to im
press the new boss. To avoid being
misled, Norm double-checked all
statements that were made. If he
was told that bad tools had been
at fault, he asked such questions
as:

• Were the tools poorly de
signed or were they merely
worn out and in need of
maintenance?
• Could better maintenance
have prevented the problem?
• Was it possible that only
some of the key high volume
tools were the source of the
problems? In that case, would
the availability of a duplicate
set of tools have allowed for
the needed maintenance?
By asking questions such as
these, statements could be pinned
down to more factual data. With

out being obvious, Norm gradually
accumulated a “bank” of informa
tion which was correlated with
past sales. To this he added the
data accumulated during his own
tenure. The pictorial diary was then
prepared. Since growth was being
emphasized by the company, two
projections were made for the
balance of the ten-year period.
These were based on:
• Rate of growth for the first
three years.
• Rate of growth for the first
five years.
The first three years would pro
ject the trend if the high rate of
sales increase experienced in the
first three years could be duplicat
ed. The five-year period, on the
other hand, was a more conserva
tive estimate because it reflected
the problems incident to the PIC
move and the effect of a business
recession. The favorable effect of
a major competitor’s strike, which
occurred in the sixth year, was not
included because this was con
sidered to be a non-recurring
windfall.
Corrective programs that had
been instituted by Norm and his
predecessor gradually began to take
hold. Although production volume
continued to slip, defective produc
tion was reduced materially. It was
now only a matter of time before
the problems of tooling and setup
would be corrected. The Durard
Company had profited immensely
from the long strike of its com
petitor because it was able to take
business on a more selective basis
and set up certain equipment to
run continuously, day-in and dayout. One-shift operations were ex
panded to two shifts and the work
week was extended to 45 hours.
Sales and profits soared—somewhat
relieving a serious shortage of
working capital.
Norm felt that the pictorial diary
of problems experienced by the
Durard Company, as depicted on
page 17, could serve a two-fold
purpose:

1. It would provide a his
Management Adviser

tory of past events and dem
onstrate their effect on opera
tions.
2. The availability of this
type of data would be helpful
in management meetings to
reinforce the need for solid
planning.
It seemed that the two previous
general managers had moved too
quickly to fulfill the company’s de
sire for growth—with the conse
quence that the company’s work
ing capital had been seriously im
paired. As a result of this and the
other observations made by Norm,
the following Ten Commandments
for Expansion were established:
1. Expand in your own field of
expertise. Competition is tough
enough without giving your com
petitors a built-in advantage.
2. Evaluate the market potential
before expanding. Check the life
cycle of your products to assure
that you don’t find yourself making
a horse-and-buggy product in the
automotive age.
3. Check possible monopoly re
strictions. There’s no point in ex
panding and then going through
divestiture proceedings.
4. Evaluate your financial re
sources. Determine the potential ef
fect on working capital if things
don’t go according to plan.
5. Check what your competitors
are doing. If they have already em
barked on a major expansion pro
gram, you may want to take a
different course to avoid a large
investment in excess facilities of
that particular product.
6. Don’t expand just for the sake
of size. There’s nothing to be
gained by increasing sales at the
sacrifice of profits.
7. Coordinate engineering and
production activities. Make certain
that bills of material and process
specifications
are
documented
rather than being kept in some
one’s head. This applies to non
manufacturing activities with equal
force.
8. If the design of a product is
changed, modify the tooling im
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mediately. Waiting until the order
is processed can mean expensive
delays and problems in scheduling.
9. Don’t expand beyond the
limits of available skills. Hold ex
pansion within the limits of the
skills that can be made available
in the foreseeable future—other
wise efficiency and utilization of
equipment will suffer.
10. Transfer the required skills
—hourly as well as salaried. If some
employees are reluctant to relocate,
ask them to stay on for an addi
tional six-month period to train
employees at the new location. The
extra travel and living expenses
will be far cheaper in the long
run.

The company recognized that its
policies emphasizing growth had
been taken too literally by past
general managers. To avoid a re
currence, the ten commandments
were summarized in the form of a
policy letter to all members of
management. All subsequent plans
for expansion were reviewed by
a committee headed by the execu
tive vice president and made up
of representatives of the following
disciplines:

Ten Commandments for
Expansion:
1. Expand in your own field

of expertise.
2. Evaluate market potential

before expanding.
3. Check possible monopoly

restrictions.

4. Evaluate your financial
resources. Determine the

potential effect on working
capital if things don’t go

according to plan.

5. Check what your competi
tors are doing to ensure that

you’re not expanding in an
overcrowded field.

6. Don’t expand just for the
sake of size.
7. Coordinate engineering
and production activities.
8. If the design of a product

•
•
•
•

Operations
Engineering
Sales
Finance

This group met once a month
to evaluate plans for future ex
pansion and to review progress on
current moves. The results of these
meetings were summarized and
presented to the officers of the
company for their review.
Establishment of the ten com
mandments and the monthly re
views had a salutary effect. The
rate of growth for the balance of
the ten-year period was not as
great as the company had hoped
for originally. However, the date
did exceed the growth pace of the
first five-year period. The growth
of profits, however, tripled the rate
of the first five years. As a result,
losses were minimized because of
a more orderly expansion.

is changed, modify the

tooling immediately.

9. Don’t expand beyond

the limits of available skills.
10. Transfer the required
skills—hourly as well as

salaried. If some employees

are reluctant to relocate,
ask them to stay on for an

additional six-month period

to train employees at the

new location. The extra
travel and living expenses

will be cheaper in the long

run.
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